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[Editor's Note
The editors of THE CATHOLIC LAWYER believe that two purposes may
be served by presenting in these pages Monsignor Joseph Graneris' essay
on the meaning and method of the philosophy of law
This essay will serve to introduce to American lawyers other studies
by the same author. Those studies, directed to specific problems in the
relationship between natural law and positive law, will be presented from
time to time in future issues of THE CATHOLIC LAWYER. Monsignor
Graneris has authorized Father Cahill to translate and adapt his work
for such presentation. The studies are rooted in the author's deep
learning of the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. He draws upon that
learning, not merely to speculate about natural law or to develop its
moral precepts, as most writers in the scholastic tradition have done,
but rather to find in natural law the validating and quickening element
of positive law.

t This article, in its original form, was published as the introductory chapter of the
author's work PHILOSOPHIA JURIS (1943).
* Professor of Philosophy of Law at the Pontifical Institute of Civil and Canon Law,

Lateran University, Rome; Prelate of the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office.
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MEANING AND METHOD

The essay, presented here out of its
original context and in somewhat altered
form, serves a more immediate purpose. It
delineates clearly the concept of jurisprudence as a complex discipline which draws
upon general philosophy, as well as upon
legal science and legal history, to develop a
reasoned philosophy of what law is and
ought to be, and to implement that philosophy in the lawyer's art.
Every inquiry into jurisprudence offers a
generalized view of law. The viewpoint
taken by any inquirer, in his investigations
and in his report of them, has for its major
premise the inquirer's philosophy - the
meaning he finds in man and the world.
Often, the major premise is inarticulate,
in the inquirer's report and even in his own
mind, so that one who reads his report is
asked to accept the product of a philosophy
without knowledge of the philosophy's character, and even without notice of its existence.
With increasing frequency, our contemporary writers in jurisprudence claim that
their study of law has no philosophical
premises. The disclaimer itself rests upon
a philosophical postulate- that a philosophy
of law is impossible, or that law is a phenomenon only and is adequately understood
without philosophical inquiry.
While the jurisprudential inquirer's viewpoint on law is inspired by his philosophy,
that viewpoint in turn directs the choice
and use of method in the inquiry. A method
whose scope and bent distort the object to
be studied, or whose potential for aberration is not realized, can be as misleading to
the inquirer and to his reader as a faulty
philosophy. ]
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metaphysics, saying that he is to be
numbered among those wiser men "whose
learning is not pursued for the sake of utility, but for the sake of learning itself."'
Yet one should take care not to infer from
this statement that the noblest of mental
disciplines is to be accounted a useless
study. The soul of man, though it is not the
slave of his body, sustains the body in life.
God does not exist to serve the world, yet
the world's existence without God is inconceivable. So also, though usefulness is
not the raison d'etre of metaphysics, for
the science of metaphysics was not developed to serve utility, yet metaphysics is a
necessary development of human thought.
Metaphysics is born of that necessity by
which the human mind is driven, as if by
its own weight, to investigate the intimate
nature of things and their ultimate causes.
The jurists throw out a question, "What
is the use of the philosophy of law?", and
the philosophers take it up in all seriousness: "Philosophy is beyond the useful, for
it is necessary, indispensable, immanent. Indeed, one does not philosophize because he
wants to, but because it is impossible not to
2
philosophize."
The force of this natural desire is so
great and so broad, that whatever be the
science to which a man devotes himself, he
forever feels the insufficiency of his knowledge and is oppressed by that shortcoming,
until he pursues his study into the realm of
philosophy. The several sciences are like
I
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so many sides of a single mountain - from
whatever side you scale the mountain, your
ascent is imperfect and you are less than
satisfied, unless you reach the summit. And
that summit, from whatever side or science
it be approached, is one and the same. It is
philosophy, in which within the natural
order of knowledge and prescinding from
the supernatural, every science must achieve
its perfection.
Philosophy in Life
What has been said about sciences in
general is especially true of those which
study human action. As long as we merely
speculate, there is an apparent possibility
of a skeptical approach, or at least one may
entertain the illusion that he is not making
judgments and choices. When, however, we
begin to act, .then we begin necessarily to
struggle against the precepts of skepticism,
and we are conscious of that struggle if our
action is truly human. We do not act humanly except by the exercise of choice, we
choose nothing except from the desire
for a purpose, we do not set up purposes
for ourselves unless under the command or
influence of a settled way of conceiving ahd
ordering our lives. This way is a synthetic
or philosophical view of the universe, or
this way is at least a necessary, though perhaps remote and subconscious, consequence
of that view.
Human conduct, because it proceeds
from choice, therefore drives the actor, not
only out of physical inertia, but also out of
that philosophical indifference in which the
skeptics try to immure mankind. The spiritual-minded and the materialist, the atheist
and the theist, the ascetic and the sensualist, rarely accord with each other in their
aspirations or in their conduct, for in willing
and in acting every man is led by his con-
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cept of the universe, so that his every deliberate action expresses his judgment and
his conviction upon the purpose and value
of human life and, therefore, upon the ultimate meaning of the universe of things. So
true is this, that when life is understood in
a human and active sense, the common
dictum, "one must live first, and then philosophize," must give place to the truer
statement, "to live is to philosophize."
It is not to be wondered at that all disciplines which directly study human conduct are under a greater necessity of ascending the high mountain of philosophy. The
object they study, human conduct, implicitly contains philosophy, as if in its seed,
and our minds, by an instinct of their own,
feel that their-knowledge of this object cannot become perfect until that implicit philosophy has been made explicit, revealing
the meaning and the value of our conduct.
A very clear example of this necessity is
seen in the study of the law of crimes. Because that branch of the law is concerned
with human conduct more evidently, more
immediately, and more exclusively, than the
other areas of law, the study of criminal law
has always maintained more intimate and
more manifest connections with philosophy.
All jurists recognize the fact that philosophy
strongly influences the penal law - that they
dispute whether the influence it exercises
is useful or harmful is another matter.
We have, in the foregoing, anticipated
an objection which may be raised, "all law
is oriented toward action, which is far removed from philosophy." In action itself,
that is, in the very nature of human conduct, we find the strongest impulse to philosophical thinking, for our conduct grows
out of philosophy, it has its foundations in
philosophy, and its throws us into philosophical study.
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Philosophy in Law and
Law in Philosophy
It is indeed true that the lawyer's greatest
need is for that art or skill by which he applies legal rules to facts, and that art may
seem remote from the labored dicta of
philosophers. Yet if that art is to have any
solid foundation, it can never tear itself
entirely away from philosophy; if it does so,
it is reduced to a merely arbitrary and mechanical skill of word-weaving. Certainly,
no lawyer is a lawyer of the first rank until
he so thoroughly grasps certain philosophical principles that he can use them to clarify
the enacted rules of law and apply those
rules skilfully.
It is a datum of history that there have
always been, between philosophy and law
and between lawyers and philosophers, a
mutual attraction and a mutual influence.
Surely one cannot take too seriously Ulpian's claim which was placed in the very
first line of the Pandects, as if it proposed
or promised that the Corpus Juris should
teach "the true philosophy." ' 3 But perhaps
one should put even less trust in the words
of the chief prophet of the modem "pure
doctrine" of law, which promise us a jurisprudence uncontaminated by any ideo4
logical element, religious or metaphysical.
We cannot blink the fact that many of
the most serious philosophers, from Plato
and Aristotle to Kant and Hegel, have found

I "For this cause are we called priests; we worship
justice, we profess to know good and evil, separating equity from iniquity, discerning the lawful
from the unlawful, making men desire goodness,
not only by fear of penalties, but by the exhortation of rewards, professing, if I am not mistaken,
the true philosophy and no counterfeit." D. 1, 1, 1,
§ 1.
4 Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, 50 L. Q. REV.
474, 480-85 (1934).

law among the objects of their consideration, and have often attributed to it a prime
position in their studies. Among these we
must count Cicero, who believed that his
legal writings found favor because they
drew upon philosophical wisdom.r, Vico,

when well advanced in the study of law,
found himself compelled to go back to the
philosophers, to learn not only moral doctrine but metaphysical discipline." Geny,
in his earlier work, could only describe the
problems of positive law, and perceived that
his powers were limited by a deficiency in
philosophical knowledge. Having again
studied philosophy, he undertook his great
work, in which philosophical principles ex7
ercise profound control.
Vico explains more fully the need for
philosophy in legal studies in the prologue
to his work De Uno, "All jurisprudence is
rooted in reason and authority, upon these
as a basis, jurisprudence professes to apply
the enacted laws to the facts. Reason consists in the necessity of nature, and authority in the determinations of lawmakers.
Philosophy explores the necessary causes of
things, while history tells us what lawmakers
have determined. And so the whole of jurisprudence is a coalescence of three parts philosophy, history and the special art of
applying law to facts."
Put in another way, the thorough student
of law must have three endowments or accomplishments: a philosophy, which rationally deduces the highest principles of
law from the necessary and ultimate causes
of the universe; a science, which understands correctly the laws enacted by human
determinations made in the course of his-

CICERO, TUSCUL., Bk. 1, n. 3.
6 Vico, AUTOBIOGRAFIA.
7 GENY, SCIENCE ET TECHNIQUE 5, 10, 11,
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tory; and an art, by which enacted laws
are applied to facts. One who has the science only may be called a jurist; one who
has also the art may be an effective counsellor; one who has the philosophy, as well as
the science and art, should be called a jurisprudent, for a man is prudent when he
knows, not only singular facts and technical procedure, but also the universal
principles of reason applicable to the case
in hand. Because any student of law quite
reasonably wishes to deserve the name jurisprudent, so that his science and skill will
not depart from truth and justice, we hold
with Cicero that "legal learning [should
be] drawn deep from philosophy held
dearly." 8
For a lawyer to give his efforts to philosophical study is no useless enterprise. He
will not come back empty-handed from the
sources whence are drawn the life of the
positive law and the vitality of the lawyer's
art. His contact with philosophy will help
him to recognize and escape that poorness
of spirit which he finds so often oppressing
him as he reads legal literature - the writing
lacks the salt of philosophy and has lost
its savor.
At this point, it seems needful to consider a little more carefully the peculiar
character of the philosophy of law, and
this we shall do by comparing it with other
disciplines of the law and of philosophy,
and by determining more closely the precise function and method of the philosophy
of law.
Is There a Philosophy of Law?
Some divide philosophy into the pure
and the specialized, and assign the philosophy of law to the latter category. This dis
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vision does not entirely content us, for it
creates at least one grave danger, that of
confounding philosophy with an empiric
application of conclusions drawn from philosophy. Just as science, when it is called
"applied," is moribund because it is passing
over into a mechanical art in which those
who do not knpw science apply rules imposed by science, so "applied" philosophy
loses more and more of the character of
philosophy, and takes on the marks of an
inferior discipline. Others divide philosophy into the general and the particular. The
former considers the intimate character or
the ultimate causes of beings in general, and
the latter investigates the characteristics and
causes of single classes of beings.
We prefer this division to the one suggested above, and we believe that the philosophy of law can be properly listed among
the "particular philosophies," for its object
of study is not being as such, but that particular historical phenomenon which we call
the phenomenon of law.
We feel that this distinction can be maintained, though it is rejected by many moderns, especially the idealists, who say that
philosophy has no parts, but only different
problems, in whose solution the whole of
philosophy is employed; indeed there are
some who say that there is only one problem, though it shows itself in many forms,
to whose solution the entire powers of philosophy should be constantly applied.
Certainly the parts of philosophy are
bound together by a close nexus into a unity
that is divided with difficulty; that unity
arises from the fixed viewpoint from which
the philosopher views any object, and from
the constant influence of the principles governing the philosophical process, and this
unity explains why in every philosophical
system the solution of single problems

MEANING AND METHOD

seems to flow with, and almost to be imposed by, a certain necessity from the character and spirit of the system. From this it
follows that the so-called particular philosophies do not live their own lives, independent of the general philosophy or outside
the complete philosophical system; but one
should not infer from this that the existence
of particular philosophies is to be denied,
provided that their particularity is premised
only upon the particularity of the material
objects they examine and provided, further,
that the nature of that object is such as to
require that the philosophical principles,
though they remain always the same, shall
be applied in a particular way.
Since the phenomenon of law presents
characteristics which not only distinguish it
from other phenomena, but which suggest
peculiar problems to be resolved by philosophical consideration, and which require
a special adaptation in the use of general
philosophical principles, therefore we may
say that the philosophical examination of
the phenomenon of law is a particular philosophy or, what amounts to the same
thing, we may make of this examination a
special treatise, distinct from, though not
independent of, general philosophy.
Legal Philosophy and
World Philosophy
To clarify the meaning we attribute to
the distilnction between general philosophy
and particular philosophy, it may be helpful to differentiate between the ascending
and descending methods of philosophical
study. The first rises from a consideration
of beings to an investigation of their ultimate causes; the second descends from the
ultimate causes to an explanation of beings.
It will occur to the reader that this
double method is quite similar to the binary

method of induction and deduction which
is applicable in general philosophy or in
any particular philosophy. In applying this
double rhythm to the whole field of philosophy, it seems best that general philosophy
take the ascending and particular philosophies the descending method.
In its first stage, philosophy strives to
understand the universe of things, speculating about being as such and its most
universal causes, of which the ancient philosophers enumerated four: the material,
formal, efficient and final causes. In this
effort, the philosopher does not tarry in an
analytical consideration of single entities,
for that is not needed for his purpose, but
he views the universe synthetically and then
hurries on to the heights of metaphysics;
once arrived there, he, in one formula or
even in a single word, comprehends the
universe, and describes and explains it. Of
these formulas, five are used most often
in our time: materialism, evolutionism,
idealism, pantheism, theism.
An examp-fe of this hurried ascent is
found in that lucid article9 of the Summa,
a brief abridgment of all metaphysics and
theodicy, in which St. Thomas ascends by
"the five ways," to the first mover unmoved, to the first efficient cause, to the
entity per se necessary, to the source of the
goodness and perfection of all things, to
the supremely intelligent something which
directs all things to their ends. He examines no species of beings in any special way,
but views them all at once from the most
general aspects of motion, efficient causality, contingency, graded perfection, and
finality; and from these common marks, as
if by public highways, one terminus is
reached, namely God, so that the whole
)

AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, i,

q. 2, a. 3.
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metaphysical system of St. Thomas takes
the character and name of theism.
Since one who has completed this philosophical ascent views in a single glance
the whole world's constitution, he is prepared to consider the world's several parts,
each in its relation to the whole; this consideration is the task of the return journey,
the descent from the summit achieved in
the synthetic process; this is the second
phase of philosophical inquiry, in which the
object of consideration is "this kind of being," the single classes of beings and their
particular characteristics, which were neglected during the ascent.
We feel that in proceeding thus, the order
of thought and learning is more securely
preserved; the ascent to the metaphysical
summit is not altogether impossible for one
who begins in the analytical way, yet it certainly is much more difficult, as the recent
unhappy history of so-called "scientific philosophy" shows; since that philosophy took
the analysis of selected classes of beings as
its' point of departure, it could never break
out of the bounds which it imposed upon
itself at its inception; for this cause, though
it assumed the name "philosophy," it never
achieved universality, which is the true dignity and apex of contemplation which characterizes philosophy. Why it could not make
that achievement is not hard to understand;
unless one has seen a region from its mountaintop, he has difficulty in achieving a clear
concept of the region's unity by laboriously
plodding each of its ways and by-ways; that
is to say, unless one has examined synthetically into the meaning of the whole universe, it will be nearly impossible for him
to interpret the universe part by part. These
are the reasons why we believe that, to the
particular or analytical philosophies, the
general, synthetic philosophy, rightly called
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"the prime philosophy," is a necessary
prelude.
The Law of Liberty
When the philosopher, coming down
from the mountain-top, begins his analysis,
he finds all things divided into two great
classes; the first embraces all things ruled
by necessity; the other, all those which obey
the laws of liberty. They are, respectively,
the realm of nature and the realm of spirit.
Here, we can ignore all the further distinctions that may be made in the realm of
nature, for the law which we are to study
is not linked with natural necessity but with
spiritual liberty. But we must attend to distinctions occurring in the realm of spirit,
for they closely touch the object of our
study.
First, the philosophers usually distinguish the consideration of spirit itself from
the consideration of spirit in its activities,
that is, psychology and its related disciplines, as set apart from the other areas of
the philosophy of the spirit such as art, economics, ethics whose object is some activity
of the spirit.
These activities of the spirit divide themselves into two classes, according as they
have or have not connected with them a
sense of obligation. Art is typical of the
activities which are not connected with this
sense; of the other kind there are three
principal types: religion, morality, the law.
Here we have three objects of philosophical
speculation which comprise a distinct sector of the realm of spirit in which our liberty
is under the yoke of obligation, and the law
is one of these objects.
To state briefly the position of the philosophy of law within the universal philosophy, this discipline of ours is a particular
philosophy having for its object one of the
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spiritual activities in which the sense of
obligation is found.
From what follows it may more clearly
appear just what area of the province of
activity we have described belongs, respectively, to religion, morality, and law.
The Science of Law What Says the Law?
Legal studies can be distributed under
three headings: science, history, and philosophy. Science considers laws in being,
analyzing individual legal rules, explaining
their meaning, their effects and their limits,
so that Kant could say that the jurist knows
only what is law, that is, what is determined
by the law of a given time and place.
Yet one must recognize that scientific
knowledge is influenced by the human
mind's deep seated tendency to rise from
the particular to the general. In legal science the effect of this generalizing tendency
appears in four distinct phases.
In the first, particular enactments are explained merely analytically and expositorily.
In the second, the enactments which have
a common object are collected and co6rdinated into a sort of unity, as a distinct legal
institution, such as the domestic relations.
In the third phase, fundamental principles are drawn from the single enactments
and institutions existing in the law of a
given society, and from these principles a
legal system is elaborated.
In the final stage of generalization, a
higher unity is sought out and established
by searching several legal systems for those
general principles commonly contained and
enunciated in those systems. This last step
in progressive synthesis or scientific generalization is called, variously, jurisprudence, or the science, the doctrine, or the
theory of law. The multiplicity of names is

an indication of the legal scientists' uncertainty regarding the scope of their field.
That uncertainty will be discussed later.
The History of Law Whence Came the Law?
History considers laws in their making,
investigating the evolution of law in successive times. It has the same generalizing
propensity that we found in science. The
propensity's effect in history shows itself in
a series of stages roughly parallel to the
stages of scientific generalization.
We will discuss only the last stage or
level of historical study, for that comes
closest to the level of philosophy. As historical inquiry broadens and deepens, the
investigators manifest an increased intellectual impulse to discover organic connections between the diverse elements of the
lives of the several peoples, and more easily
find general evolutionary forms which are
called the laws of legal evolution. All these
discoveries and findings, taken together and
reduced to a single system, comprise the
highest level of history, called "ideal," or
"eternal," or philosophical history, which
parallels the theory of law mentioned in
the preceding section.
Here, in the ultimate stage of historical
inquiry, recurs the uncertainty of denomination mentioned in connection with the
last stage of scientific inquiry into law. That
uncertainty merits closer examination. It
arises because different investigators give
different value to the conclusions reached
in the ultimate level of science and of history. Some regard the conclusions as mere
general formulas, relative and therefore
variable, and valid only for the legal systems from which they were drawn. But
there are others who ascribe to these conclusions a universal validity, as principles
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and doctrines valid always and everywhere,
to which all possible legal systems must
yield conformity and obedience.
This uncertainty in the interpretation of
the ultimate conclusions of legal science and
of legal history, while it explains the variety
in denomination, reveals also a latent
equivocation rooted in unclear perceptions
of the concepts and respective boundaries
of science, history and philosophy. To bring
order out of this confusion, some remarks
on philosophy should be added to what has
been said on science and history.
The Philosophy of Law
What the Law Is and Should Be
Philosophy is the knowledge of things
viewed in relation to their ultimate causes.
The philosopher undertakes to explain
things, not by their immediate or proximate
causes, but by their mediate or remote
causes and, thus, by their ultimate causes.
This is the mark that fundamentally distinguishes philosophy from science and from
history, for those two disciplines inquire
into a thing's causes which are immediate
and proximate, not into those which are
ultimate.
The more remote a cause is within its
series, the broader its scope of influence, so
that as one's mind rises higher in pursuing
an inquiry, it reaches causes which explain
an even greater range of things, until it
reaches the causes that explain all things
and bring all into unity. Thus, an explanation of anything, if pursued to the ultimate,
comes to relate that thing to the causes of
all things, and to assign that thing to its
proper place in the universe. Because philosophy consists precisely in this tracing to
the ultimate, one may say that to philosophize on anything is to view it in its universal aspect. Whether the philosopher is
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treating of the material universe, or of any
individual thing, or any class of things, the
object he deals with is always taken, at
least formally or methodically, under the
aspect of universality - each object is considered in relation to the universal complex
of beings and the universal causes of things
Because the object of philosophical inquiry is always universal, at least in its
formal aspect, it follows that the inquiry's
conclusions are universal. They are not
limited to any number of things, nor even
to things that exist or have existed or will
exist, but they extend to all possible within
that determined area of being which comprises the material object of the inquiry
made by the particular philosophical discipline.
Since the examination of a thing under
its universal aspect is naturally calculated
to discover the principles or conditions
which that thing must obey if it is to accord
with the universe, and if the part is not to
be at odds with its whole, we may say that
philosophy differs from science and from
history because philosophy studies law, not
as law exists or as law is made, but as law
should be and should be made. Necessarily,
this differentiation is denied by all schools
of thought, like agnosticism and positivism,
which profess not to know what should be,
as well as by those, like idealism, which
identify what is with what should be. Kelsen declares that his pure science of law
presents "law as it is," without qualifying
it as just or unjust. For Hegel, the reasonable was real, and the real reasonable. Of
course, neither the science of law nor legal
history merely describes existing law these disciplines evaluate existing law and
guide the lawmaking process. They do so,
however, only in the light of the proximate
causes and circumstances, special or gen-
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eral. They can, therefore, indicate how a
particular system of law can be improved,
or better adapted to the peculiar social attitudes of a given people or to the needs of
a certain society. They cannot, obviously,
discover the ultimate rules to which any and
all enacted laws must conform.
From what has been said, should appear
the reason why, though the general science
of law and ideal legal history are not in
fact philosophical disciples, many persons
take them for philosophies. Such science
and history have objects and bases that are
less than universal - therefore they are not
philosophies. Yet, because their objects and
bases are extremely general, they closely
approach the character of philosophy. Persons who take these two disciples to be
philosophies, or who attempt to put them
in the place of philosophy, do so either because they are influenced by positivism to
ignore or to deny the existence of philosophy properly so called, or because they
push beyond the limits of science and history, unwittingly and perhaps unwillingly,
and then stray obliquely into the province
of philosophical universality. Vico pushed
his historical studies of the law into philosophical conclusions. Radbruch remarks
upon the legal scientists whose "purely empirical general jurisprudence" purports to
do away with the philosophy of law, at the
same time that the scientists' writings manifest the inextinguishable human tendency
to philosophize.
The Philosophy of Law

-

Its Functions

Philosophy, then, considers law under its
universal aspect, and law as it ought to be.
Here, as in any of the particular or "descending" philosophies, the basic task is to
understand the particular object studied
and to determine its place in the universe.

The task is approached in two steps: an
investigation of law's constitutive elements,
and a search for law's necessary relations
with the world as a whole.
Through the first inquiry is formed the
concept or abstract idea of law or the formal category of legality - the assembled
marks, characteristics and essential elements of law yield the definition of law. To
define anything is to distinguish it from all
other things, giving it its proper place in
the order of thought. Therefore, this first
inquiry is the logicalfunction of the philosophy of law.
The secQnd investigation, which seeks to
know the relations between law and all else
in the world, though it does not center on
the single forms law has taken in history,
nevertheless must study law as a thing
really existing. It represents, therefore, the
metaphysical function of the philosophy of
i i
law.
The real relations between any one thing
and other things fall into two classes or
orders - they are relations of either efficient or final causality. To complete his
task, the legal philosopher must discover
both the basis of law and the purpose of
law. The basis of law is the ultimate efficient cause of law - that which validates
law, or that which gives reality to the discrimination between law and things which
have the name and appearance of law but
which are spurious. The purpose of law
refers io the purpose inherent in all law
and in any system of law. The contemplation of that purpose yields the fundamental,
constant and universal rules to which the
legal order must yield obedience.
Thus the metaphysical function of the
philosophy of law is dual: the ontological
function is to investigate law's ultimate
sources or universal basis; the deontologi-
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cal Junction is to deduce from the ultimate
purpose of law the necessary rules which
govern all human activity in which law is
enacted, interpreted or applied.

The Philosophy of Law

Its Divisions

-

In outline, the philosophy of law is
divided as follows:
Philosophy of law
logical part
(on the concept of law)
ontological part (on the basis of law)
metaphysical
deontological part (on legal method)

The Philosophy of Law

-

Its Object

In the scholastic tradition, the philosophy
of law studied only natural law. The object
of the present study is broadened to include
positive law as well. In another respect,
however, this study's object is narrower'than
those contemplated by many of the older
writers on natural law. Their deductive
elaboration of the several precepts of natural law seems not a proper task for the
philosophy of law.

Method in the Philosophy of Law
In general, method is the way by which
one arrives at a set goal - in the philosophy
of law, method is the route of inquiry which
leads to a correct philosophical evaluation
of law.
Clearly, the development of the several
parts of the philosophy of law will require
special discussions of method, so that the
present remarks are very general, being directed to the broader lines of development
in legal philosophy.
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Best known is the distinction between
deductive and inductive methods. The deductive works down from principles to
applications, from the general to the particular, from rules to facts. The inductive
rises from applications to principles, from
the particular to the general, from facts to
rules. The one is said to proceed a priori,
the other a posteriori. Philosophical literature and even single works employ the
terms analytical and synthetic variously, at
times to signify the a priori and a posteriori
methods respectively, and at other times in
a converse signification.
The deductive or a priori method in the
philosophy of law develops the ultimate elements or the ultimate causes of the legal
order out of pure rational principles; the
inductive or a posteriori method searches
out those elements or causes among the
facts of experience.
Either method involves difficulties and
dangers, especially in the philosophy of
law. Holding fast to rational principles and
neglecting to examine empiric facts, the
deductive method risks falling into an abuse
of abstraction. Being content with formulas
extremely indefinite and rather empty, this
method views the legal phenomenon from
afar, and explains it imperfectly, or even
does violence to it, casting it into forms
arbitrarily conceived and quite unsuited to
the phenomenon. The inductive method,
with its grasp tight upon historical facts, and
straining to extract from them all elements
and principles of law (as if law were nothing more than a fact to be described by
scientific investigators), leans by its own
weight toward positivism.
We have said that these two contrary
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dangers are intensified in the philosophy
of law. That is so because law is neither a
pure doctrine of the ideal order only, to be
evolved theoretically, nor a fact only, to be
examined and described empirically; rather,
law has two elements, one empiric And the
other ideal. Law is an idea seeking facts in
which it may assume a concrete and historical form, or law is an historical fact having
in the ideal order laws to govern it, that
is, having an intrinsic necessity to move
in obedience to rational principles.
The philosopher cannot speak correctly
of law unless he has always before his eyes
law's two elements, the ideal examined by
deductive method, and the empiric studied
inductively. Thus, to guide his inquiry in
direction and depth, he cannot rely exclusively and slavishly upon either of these
methods, but must combine them, one with
the other, to meet the exigencies of the
material studied.
Neither method is entirely uniform in its
mode of operation. The deductive has more
of such uniformity than the inductive, and
yet it varies, for example, according as the
principles employed are drawn from different sources or are endowed with different
values - thus we have the deductive methods called innativistic, critical, idealistic,
etc.
The Particularist and Comparative
Approaches to Induction
In the inductive method there are more
obvious differences which, though they may
not constitute distinctly individual methods,
at least indicate the tendencies and attitudes
which prevail in various schools of philosophy. These differences are manifested principally in the scope of the material studied
and the manner of viewing it.
As to scope, the particularized method,

in which the philosopher draws his conclusions from an analysis of a single legal system, is distinguished from the comparative
method, in which several systems are
analysed.
Particularism is the method to which
writers are addicted who, for example, discourse upon the basis only of the Roman
Law, as Jehring does, or of the Napoleonic
Code, as did most of the French jurists of
the nineteenth century. Some natural law
writers, like Puffendorf and Wolff, philosophized upon the basis of natural law only,
and considered natural law as a code analogous to the codes of positive law, and even
as the model of the code enacted in their
own time and country.
Comparativism is held so firmly by some
writers that they assert that if philosophy of
law exists at all, its sole admissible function
or basis is the comparative study of different
systems of law.
Both tendencies have their vices and
their dangers. Theoretically, it is, of course,
possible to draw a universal understanding
of a species from the analysis of an individual. Practically, however, the slowness of
the human mind makes success in the
undertaking difficult, for there is serious
risk of confounding individuating characteristics with the species' essential elements.
Thus, the particularizingmethod in philosophy of law is in danger of reaching conclusions'not valid for all legal systems, or
of doing no more than picturing or ideally
representing the legal system that is taken
for the single specific sample. The comparative method avoids this extreme narrowness, but has no greater facility in
,reaching universal conclusions, and so does
not achieve a philosophy of law but only a
general science of law or, an ideal history
of law. Those who follow this method are
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so influenced by a desire for uniformity that
they tend to create fictitious similarities and
to ignore differences between the legal
systems they examine.
The Dynamic and Static Tendencies
in Induction
The inductive method varies, according to
the manner of viewing the material studied,
between the static and dynamic tendencies.
The former argues, as one does in science,
from facts viewed in a determined or fixed
form, or in a given time and place, without
attention to the historical development of
the facts. The latter tendency, characteristic
of history rather than science, leans in the
opposite direction, passing over the unchanging elements of a situation and perceiving only the continuous flow of change.
Its conclusions are often extremely flexible
and nearly empty formulas, indicating
neither the substance of things nor their
essential characteristics, but only pointing
the alleged direction of the law's evolution.
In the dynamic tendency, one can distinguish an historical predilection, which
pursues facts through every stage of their
known development, and a genetic preference, which attends only to the mutations
that occur in the first moment of development. The genetic preference is to study the
birth processes of law, either in the early
epochs of the lives of the various peoples
(so that it is an ethnological tendency), or
in the law's first manifestations in individual
consciousness (a psychological tendency).
One who relies exclusively upon historical method must collect single facts ad
infinitum; logically, he can never rest. Nor
can he offer conclusions universally valid,
for the basis of facts collected and analysed
will never be complete - thus, any conclusion he reaches is less than certain.
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The followers of the genetic preference
confuse two questions - being asked "What
is law?" they answer with a statement of
how law comes to be, confounding the
essence of a thing with the manner of its
beginnings. They have another difficulty,
which occurs in the selection of primary
legal facts, either in the primitive life of
society or in the dawning of individual consciousness. In the first stages of any thing's
development, the elements of the thing
developing usually appear unclearly and
intermingled, so that extreme difficulty is
experienced in distinguishing various forms,
especially forms that are closely interrelated. Then, there is difficulty in selecting
the first facts which are to be the object of
investigation. It is not easy for the ethnologist to say which are the truly primitive
peoples and, even-after that determination
has been made, it is hard to understand and
interpret the folkways of people whose cast
of mind is so far removed from our own.
The psychologist often confuses two sources
from which he draws conclusions -the
empirical source which is the individual
consciousness, and the ideal source which
offers universal principles. To confuse these
sources is easy, because the principles cannot exercise their influence except through
the consciousness of the empirical subject.
These various tendencies are rarely found
in isolation, being usually mixed and shifting, so that their respective shortcomings
are partly compensated and partly aggravated.
To list the composite methods would be
an interminable task. The chief of them
are the methods of comparative ethnology
and comparative history, which draw their
(Continued on page 237)

